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Editor's Note: This article is the first of a series of articles which will appear in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER about the increasingly important U.S. trade
laws. Since the antidumping and countervailing duty law was revised in 1979,
one of the most rapidly developing and hotly debated issues has been suspen-
sion and settlement agreements. This article is the first comprehensive discus-
sion of the Department of Commerce's experience with such agreements, and
the positions it has formulated based on that experience.
I. Legal and Regulatory Framework
In amending the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) law
iii the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,1 Congress sought to limit the discre-
tion that the Department of the Treasury had previously enjoyed in admin-
istering that law. For example, it established precise deadlines for inves-
tigations, 2 required annual reviews of AD/CVD orders, provided greater
transparency in proceedings,' and expanded judicial review opportunities.'
*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration. The views expressed
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Commerce.
tO'Melveny & Myers; formerly Deputy (for Policy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Import Administration.
193 Stat. 151, amending the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.2See, e.g., sections 702(c), 703 and 705(a)(1) and (b)(2) for CVD cases; and 732(c), 733 and
735(a)(1) and (b)(2) for AD cases.
3Section 751 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1675.
4See, e.g., sections 774 (hearings) and 777 (access to information) of the Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1677c, 1677f.
5Title X of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a et seq.
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Moreover, the responsibility for administering the AD/CVD law was trans-
ferred from Treasury to the Department of Commerce.6 Yet in one signifi-
cant respect, Congress broadened Commerce's7 discretion: it authorized the
Department to susltend AD and CVD investigations.'
A. SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS
Section 704 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act),' provides for
several kinds of suspension agreements in CVD investigations:" agreements
to cease exports to the U.S.; agreements under which the foreign govern-
ment eliminates subsidies, or exporters accounting for substantially all
exports renounce subsidies; agreements under which the subsidies are com-
pletely offset (as through an export tax); and agreements eliminating inju-
rious effect, including quota agreements with a foreign government (but not
with exporters).
6See section 2(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (1979), not
disapproved by Congress under 5. U.S.C. § 906; and section 1-107 of Exec. Order No. 12188,3
C.F.R., 1980 Comp., p.131; as amended by Exec. Order No. 12292, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp.,
p.134. Under section 1-101(a)(5) of the executive order, the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") is authorized to negotiate AD/CVD suspension agreements. Yet in view of Com-
merce's conduct of the investigations, it instead has negotiated all suspension agreements (in
consultation with the office of the USTR). The Deputy USTR recently led discussions of an
injurious effect suspension agreement with Brazil in steel CVD investigations, but the inves-
tigations were concluded rather than suspended. See note 28, infra.
7The AD/CVD law refers simply to the "administering authority." See, e.g., section
701(a)(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1). Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 and Exec.
Order No. 12188, supra, make Commerce the "administering authority."
'Prior to 1980, Treasury was expressly authorized to "discontinue" AD (but not CVD)
investigations. Section 201(b)(1)(c) of the Antidumping Act, 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(c).
Consequently, CVD investigations never were suspended or discontinued. Even AD investiga-
tions were discontinued only when'the margin of dumping was minimal, price revisions to
eliminate such margins were made, and assurances were made that eliminated any likelihood of
future LTFV sales. Separate grounds for discontinuance were termination of sales to the
United States and unspecified "other circumstances" that made discontinuance appropriate (19
C.F.R. § 153.33, (1977 ed.)). The requirement of "minimal" margins generally meant that the
LTFV margins be no greater than a 1 percent weighted average on all sales by the exporter. This
requirement severely limited the number of discontinuances. On the other hand, Treasury,
unlike Commerce, could and would discontinue investigations as to particular exporters, while
proceeding to a normal conclusion with other exporters not eligible for discontinuance or not
offering the requisite price assurances (see, e.g., Motorcycles from Japan, 43 Fed. Reg. 48754
(1978)).
Under section 303(d) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d), Treasury was also authorized to waive
countervailing duties for several years during multilateral trade negotiations that led to conclu-
sion of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (usually referred to as the Subsidies Code).
919 U.S.C. § 1671. Section 704 implements Article 4(5) of the Subsidies Code.
1 Because of the use of the term "investigation," suspension agreements may not be accepted
once an AD or CVD order is issued. Annual administrative reviews under section 751 of the
Act are "proceedings" rather than "investigations." See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.1 l(b) and 355.6(b),
and S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, 62 (1979).
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Section 7341 provides for fewer kinds of suspension agreements in AD
investigations: agreements to cease exports to the U.S.; agreements to
eliminate completely sales at less than fair value (LTFV); and agreements
eliminating injurious effect (but not including quota agreements). Any
CVD or AD suspension agreement is prohibited unless: Commerce is
satisfied that suspending the investigation is in the public interest; effective
monitoring of the agreement by the U.S. is practicable; and the agreement
precludes surges of exports to the U.S. during the maximum six-month
period allowed for eliminating or offsetting subsidies or for ceasing
exports. 2 Additional requirements must be satisfied for injurious effect
agreements.13
The procedures for suspension agreements are the same in AD and CVD
investigations. Before suspending, Commerce must notify petitioner, other
parties, and the International Trade Commission (ITC) not less than 30 days
in advance; give petitioner a copy of the proposed agreement and explain
how it will be enforced; and consider parties' comments on the proposed
agreement. When Commerce does suspend, it must issue an affirmative
preliminary determination if it has not already done so." The suspension
'19 U.S.C. § 1673c. Section 734 implements Article 7 of the Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (usually referred to as the
Antidumping Code).
12Sections 704(d) and 734(d) of the Act. The six-month period does not apply to AD
agreements to cease-sales at LTFV, or to AD or CVD injurious effect agreements.13An AD or CVD injurious effect suspension agreement is authorized only when the
investigation is: (1) complex (involves many transactions or adjustments (AD) or a large
number of complicated subsidies (CVD), novel issues (both AD and CVD), or a large number
of firms (AD) or exporters (CVD)); and (2) suspension will be more beneficial to the domestic
industry than continuation of the investigation. Some believe that the latter requirement comes
close to giving petitioner veto power. As Senator Heinz remarked during floor debate on the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
I would find it very difficult to believe a judgment that the domestic industry would benefit
more from a suspension than a completed investigation if that industry had expressed its
opposition to such an action.
125 Cong. Rec. 20168 (1979).
4Sections 704(e) and 734(e) of the Act. Under sections 704(f) and 734(0 of the Act, once
Commerce suspends an investigation (other than through an injurious effect agreement), any
suspension of liquidation by virtue of an affirmative preliminary AD or CVD determination is
terminated or does not go into effect. Commerce then refunds any cash deposit or releases any
bond or other security. If Commerce concludes an injurious effect suspension agreement,
liquidation continues to be or becomes suspended. Yet Commerce may adjust the security
required to reflect the effect of the agreement.
Under sections 704(0(3) and (g) and 734(f)(3) and (g), Commerce and the ITC must
continue their investigations despite suspension if exporters (accounting for substantially all
exports) or a U.S. interested party requests continuation within 20 days of the suspension. If the
continued investigation results in a negative determination by either Commerce (because of no
subsidies or no sales at LTFV) or the ITC (because of no injury or threat of injury to the
domestic industry, or no material retardation of the establishment of such industry), then the
agreement has no force and the investigation is terminated. If both decisions are affirmative,
Summer 1984
686 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
agreement provisions of the Act are implemented through regulations at
19 C.F.R. Parts 353 (for AD investigations) and 355 (for CVD
investigations).15
The legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that Congress intended
suspension agreements to be the exception rather than the rule:
The suspension provision is intended to permit rapid and pragmatic resolutions of
countervailing duty cases. However, suspension is an unusual action which should
not become the normal means of disposing of cases. The Committee intends that
investigations be suspended only when that action serves the interests of the public
and the domestic industry affected. For this reason, the authority to suspend
investigations is narrowly circumscribed.'6
then the agreement continues in force so long as it remains in the public interest, may be
effectively monitored, and the parties carry out their obligations.
See also sections 704(h) and 734(h), regarding reviews of injurious effect suspension agree-
ments by the ITC to determine whether the injurious effect of imports concerned is completely
eliminated by the suspension agreement.
"'he regulations are slightly more detailed than their statutory counterparts. For example,
they define "exporters who account for substantially all of the imports" as those accounting for
not less than 85 percent by volume of imports. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42(c), 355.31(c). And they
define the representative period with which the level of imports should be compared during the
maximum six-month phase-out period for export cessation, and for elimination/renunciation or
offset of subsidies. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42(g), 355.31(g). In most respects the AD and CVD
suspension agreement regulations are parallel. But cf., e.g., sections 353.42(g) and 355.31(g),
where the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to exclude surging imports in CVD suspen-
sions, but not in AD suspensions.
16S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1979)(emphasis added). See similar language
regarding AD suspension agreements, id. at 71. But cf. United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 6 CIT_., Slip Op. 83-53 (June 2,1983), vacated by United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 7 CIT_ , Slip. Op. 84-639 (Feb. 24,1984). In reviewing Commerce's Final Affirmative
Determinations: Certain Steel Products from South Africa (47 Fed. Reg. 39379 (1982)), Judge
Watson interpreted the above legislative history quite differently:
The tight controls written into the law and the discretion given to the ITA were designed, not
to diminish the use of section 704, but primarily to safeguard the interests of the domestic
petitioners....
If, at any time before the end of the investigation, the ITA finds that the foreign interests have
(since the commencement of the investigation) acted to end or offered to end the practice
alleged or preliminarily found to be a subsidy, then the ITA must suspend the investigation of
that practice unless it can give a good reason for continuing the investigation. It has the
discretion to continue the investigation if it can articulate reasons which are sanctioned by
section 704. (emphasis in original) Id. at 13, 15-16.
In that case, Commerce made final affirmative determinations, but set a zero estimated duty
deposit rate based on South Africa's elimination of all subsidies after the preliminary deter-
minations on June 10 (47 Fed. Reg. 26340 (1982)), but retroactively effective to April 1, 1982.
Preferring the protection of a suspension agreement to suspension of liquidation with a zero
duty deposit rate, the U.S. industry argued that Commerce should instead have suspended its
investigations.
See also Chi Mei Industrial Co., Ltd. v. United States, CIT Court No. 84-2-00250, in which
respondent in the AD investigation of Acrylic Film, Strips and Sheets, at Least 0.030 Inches in
Thickness from Taiwan, challenges Commerce's refusal to conclude a suspension agreement
(see note 28, infra).
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Suspension agreements were also intended to be "a means of achieving the
remedial purposes of the law in as short a time as possible and with a
minimum expenditure of resources by all parties involved."' 7
B. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
In addition to suspension agreements, the Act also allows Commerce or
the ITC to terminate an investigation after notice to all parties upon peti-
tioner's withdrawal of the petition. 8 These provisions for settlement are
similar to Treasury's prior practice in terminating investigations. The leg-
islative history reveals Congress' expectation that investigations be termi-
nated only when in the public interest. 9
II. Commerce's Experience
A. 1980-MID-1983
Confronted with the new option to suspend investigations, Commerce
initially exercised it cautiously. In its first two years as the administering
authority (1980-1981), Commerce suspended only two AD and four CVD
investigations.20
On January 11, 1982, U.S. Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion and "the Five" (Republic Steel Corporation, Inland Steel Company,
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc., National Steel Corporation, and Cyclops
Corporation), filed petitions on behalf of the U.S. steel industry, alleging
subsidies and dumping on 9 steel products from 11 countries.2 Further steel
petitions were filed on May 711 and September 3.2 These steel petitions
inaugurated a new era at Commerce, quadrupling within a single year its
caseload of new investigations.' In May 1982, Commerce began discussions
17H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1979).
8Sections 704(a) and 734(a) of the Act.
'95. REP. No. 249, supra, at 54, 67. Commerce's regulations permit termination of an
investigation only when determined to be in the public interest. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.41 and 355.30.
"All suspension agreements referred to, supra and infra, are identified and described in
charts following this article.
2 Commerce made preliminary and final CVD determinations in these cases on June 10 and
August 24 (47 Fed. Reg. 26300, 39304 (1982)), and preliminary AD determinations on August 9
(47 Fed. Reg. 35646 (1982)). The products covered were: carbon steel structural shapes,
hot-rolled carbon steel plate, hot-rolled carbon steel sheet and strip, cold-rolled carbon steel
sheet and strip, galvanized carbon steel sheet, hot-rolled carbon steel bars, hot-rolled alloy steel
bars, cold-formed carbon steel bars, and cold-formed alloy steel bars.
'Commerce issued preliminary CVD determinations on October 4 (47 Fed. Reg. 44818
(1982)). The products covered were carbon steel welded pipes and tubes.
'Commerce initiated AD and CVD investigations of steel rails on September 23 (47 Fed.
Reg. 42744 (1982)).
24In 1981, Commerce conducted fewer than 50 AD/CVD investigations; in 1982, this number
quadrupled to about 200.
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with the European Communities' (EC) aimed at resolving these conten-
tious unfair trade disputes over steel through some means other than
through completion of investigations. Ultimately, the U.S. and the Euro-
pean Communities concluded two steel trade arrangements, one on carbon
steel products and the other on pipe and tube products. The principal
agreement on carbon steel restricts EC exports in 10 major carbon and alloy
steel product categories through 1985. In return for this relief from injurious
unfair trade, 15 U.S. steel producers withdrew their petitions in 44 AD and
CVD cases then pending against imports of EC steel products covered by
the arrangement.26
In view of its extraordinary settlement of the European steel AD/CVD
cases, Commerce was more inclined to conclude suspension agreements
with non-European trading partners whose steel was found to be unfairly
traded, and who preferred an agreed solution to unilateral imposition by the
U.S. of additional duties. In 1982 alone, Commerce entered into ten steel
suspensions: three AD agreements, two company subsidy renunciation
agreements, one government subsidy elimination agreement, and four gov-
ernment offsetting export tax agreements.27 In 1982 Commerce also con-
cluded two non-steel subsidy renunciation agreements with Mexico.
Continuing its experiment with suspensions in the first half of 1983,
Commerce concluded four more steel suspensions (two offsetting export
tax, and two company subsidy renunciations) and three non-steel suspen-
sions (two renunciations and one offsetting export tax).
B. MID-1983-PRESENT
Since mid-1983, Commerce has concluded only three CVD suspension
agreements: On an offsetting export tax, a company subsidy renunciation
agreement, and an export cessation agreement. During this same time
Commerce rejected requests for suspension agreements in several pending
investigations, 21 as well as a request to convert an existing export tax suspen-
'The European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community.
147 Fed. Reg. 49058 (1982).
"In United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT-, Slip Op. 83-73, 569 F.Supp. 864
(1983), vacated as moot, 7 CIT -, Slip Op. 84-12 (Feb. 12, 1984), Commerce successfully
defended an attack on the offsetting export tax suspension agreement on carbon steel plate
from Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 39394 (1982).
'Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Brazil: Final Determination of Sales at LTFV, 48 Fed. Reg.
43202 (1983); Final Determinations of Sales at LTFV: Certain Carton Closing Staples and
Staple Machines from Sweden, 48 Fed. Reg. 49323 (1983); Final Determination of Sales at
LTFV: Acrylic Film, Strips and Sheets, at Least 0.030 Inches in Thickness from Taiwan, 49
Fed. Reg. 10968 (1984) (see note 16, supra); Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determinations and Notice of Terminations of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Certain
Carbon Steel Products from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 17790 (1984) (export tax suspension
proposal); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products
from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 17988 (1984). (The Government of Brazil first proposed an injurious
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sion agreement into an injurious effect agreement establishing quotas29
Moreover, Commerce has recently proposed the first two terminations of
suspension agreements to which the foreign government concerned has
objected. 9 On March 22, Commerce signed notices of its intention to
terminate offset suspension agreements with Brazil on carbon steel plate
and carbon steel wire rod. 1 Commerce noted evidence that the government
of Brazil had failed to comply with the terms of each agreement. Principally,
the export tax that should have been collected on all carbon steel plate
exports to the U.S. on and after October 1, 1982, and on all carbon steel wire
rod exports to the U.S. on and after October 20, 1982, was not collected
before May 16, 1983. Even taking into account a 45- to 75-day grace period
for collection,32 tax payments were up to five months late.
C. PRESENT COMMERCE ATITUDES
Based on over four years' experience with suspension agreements and
settlements, Commerce has adopted a more stringent and definitive policy
with respect to them. Briefly, Commerce takes very seriously the Congres-
sional intent that suspension agreements be unusual actions, and not the
normal means of resolving cases.33
effects agreement involving quotas, and then an export tax suspension agreement, after
unilaterally imposing an export tax of 27.42 percent on March 14, 1984, retroactively effective
to March 1.); and Galv. carbon steel sheet from Australia: Preliminary determination of sales
at LTFV, 49 Fed. Reg. 29993 (1984).
'Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 39394 (1982).
"A CVD suspension under which the government of Argentina agreed to eliminate subsidies
on leather wearing apparel exported to the U.S. (46 Fed. Reg. 16697 (1981)) was first amended
(47 Fed. Reg. 58333 (1982)), and then lapsed when an order was issued (48 Fed. Reg. 11480
(1983)). The Argentine government did not object to issuance of an order.
A CVD suspension under which the government of Uruguay agreed to offset (through an
export tax) subsidies on leather wearing apparel exported to the U.S. (46 Fed. Reg. 16921
(1981)) lapsed and an order was issued when the government of Uruguay informed Commerce
that it would be unable to eliminate subsidies completely, because of its legal inability to assess
taxes retroactively and its practical inability to collect taxes from all companies concerned (47
Fed. Reg. 31032 (1982)). The Uruguayan government did not object to termination or issuance
of an order.
3149 Fed. Reg. 11864, 11865 (1984). Commerce held hearings on April 17, and posthearing
briefs were due April 27. At the time of this writing, Commerce has yet to decide whether to
terminate the agreements and to issue CVD orders.32This grace period-for 45 days following the end of the month in which the product was
exported-was first expressed in Commerce's analysis of petitioner's comments on the pro-
posed offset suspension agreement on Tool Steel from Brazil, 48 Fed. Reg. 11731 (1983).33House Subcomm. on Trade, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on H.R. 4784, Trade Remedies
Reform Act of 1984, at 13 (1984), affirms the 1979 "Congressional intent that the primary
remedy for subsidy or dumping practices be offsetting duties." "(I)n most cases, the investiga-
tion should be completed and duties imposed rather than permitting the foreign country to
continue its unfair practice .. " Id. at 14.
As the attached chart of suspensions agreements indicates, petitioners' comments have
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Commerce is also influenced by the Congressional intent that suspensions
be used when they conserve resources of all parties involved, including
Commerce. About half the time, Commerce and the ITC have been re-
quired to complete their investigations anyway.' Moreover, suspension
generally grown increasingly hostile, especially toward CVD offsetting export tax suspension
agreements. This negativism was communicated to Congress. See, e.g., the following state-
ments at Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Trade,
House Comm. on Ways and Means 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983): Statement of Sol C. Chaikin on
behalf of the Textile/ Apparel Import Steering Group, at 95,102; Statement of Jim H. Conner,
Executive Vice President, American Yarn Spinners Association, on behalf of the Ad Hoc
Labor-Industry Trade Coalition (Group of 33), at 254,261; Statement of Terence P. Stewart,
Esq., Law Offices of Eugene L. Stewart, appearing as special counsel on behalf of American
Spring Wire Corp., Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co., Florida Wire and Cable Co., PPG Industries,
Inc. (Glass Division), Roses Inc., SCM Corp. (Consumer Products Division) and the Timken
Co., at 739-42, 747-48. See also Proposed Reforms of U.S. Trade Laws: Recommendations of
the Trade Reform Action Coalition, at 7-8, 10 (June 22, 1983).
As a result, legislation recently introduced in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate would eliminate altogether Commerce's authority to suspend a CVD investigation
based on an offsetting export tax. Section 121 of S. 2139, the Comprehensive Trade Law
Reform Act of 1983, and section 102 of H.R. 4784, the Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984,
would prohibit export tax suspension agreements. The Report on H.R. 4784, supra, explains
why (at 13):
The (House Trade) Subcommittee has received many complaints from the private sector
about the acceptance of agreements from foreign governments to offset the complete amount
of net subsidies as a basis for suspending countervailing duty investigations under section
704(b). Normally, offsets take the form of the foreign government agreeing to impose an
export tax equal to the amount of the net subsidy, theoretically equivalent to an import duty.
However, there is no verification that the tax is actually being collected. In the case of
State-owned enterprises there is no guarantee that the government is not funnelling funds
into the enterprise through various indirect assists as a substitute for the subsidy in order to
ensure export competitiveness. Any delays in calculation of an export tax will increase
benefits to exporters if there are frequent and sharp devaluations of the currency.
Consequently, the Subcommittee believes it necessary to eliminate the authority to accept
agreements to impose offsets as a basis for suspending countervailing duty investigations in
order to close the present loophole which permits foreign governments to continue their
subsidy practices.
H.R. 4784, passed by the House on July 26, would limit Commerce's settlement and
suspension authority regarding quota agreements. See proposed sections 704(a)(2), 734(a)(2),
761 and 764 of the Act 130 Cong. Rec. H 7938-39, 7942-43 (daily ed. July 26, 1984).
'An AD export cessation suspension agreement on Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela
(47 Fed. Reg. 44362 (1982)), and a CVD export tax suspension agreement on Prestressed
Concrete Steel Wire Strand from Brazil (47 Fed. Reg. 47048 (1982)), lapsed when, in the
continued investigations, the ITC made negative final injury determinations. 48 Fed. Reg.
7821, 17126 (1983). Of 14 investigations continued-13 CVD and 1 AD--Carbon Steel Wire
Rod from Venezuela and Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from Brazil are the only
instances in which suspension agreements lapsed because of negative Commerce or ITC final
determinations. The other 12 continued investigations were: Leather Wearing Apparel from
Argentina, Leather Wearing Apparel from Uruguay, Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand
from South Africa, Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil, Pectin from Mexico, Polypropylene Film
from Mexico, Certain Stainless Steel Products from Brazil, Yarns of Polypropylene Fibers from
Mexico, Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, Tool Steel from Brazil, Steel Pipe and
Tube Products from South Africa, and Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico. Petitioner is
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agreements are more difficult to review than AD or CVD orders, because of
the necessity to review quarterly monitoring reports and to determine, on a
continuing basis, that the agreement remains in the public interest, is
capable of being effectively monitored, and is being implemented by the
other parties. Consequently, Commerce currently approaches any pro-
posed suspension agreement negatively. Any foreign government or com-
pany interested in an agreement should be prepared to present compelling
reasons why a suspension is preferable to final Commerce and ITC deter-
minations, despite the greater administrative burden it entails.
The Department generally views AD suspension agreements more nega-
tively than CVD agreements.35 One reason for this predisposition is that
other governments often prefer them to additional unilateral duties. Yet
governments are generally far less involved in AD than in CVD matters. In
AD cases, then, Commerce lacks a foreign relations motive to suspend
investigations.36 Another reason is that almost all AD suspensions are
essentially price undertaking agreements.37 If the remedy is price-oriented,
the issuance of an order imposing potential duties seems more appropriate.
Under an order, the domestic industry is better assured that no entries will
be liquidated without assessment of appropriate duties.
Commerce is generally less negative about CVD suspension proposals.
Most likely to be favorably considered are proposed agreements under
which the government concerned eliminates a subsidy program entirely,
regardless of the destination of the product (home market, U.S. or else-
where) and regardless of product coverage. To date, this has not occurred.
Less likely to be favorably considered are suspensions under which the
companies concerned renounce all subsidies. This has frequently occurred.
Of the present 20 CVD suspension agreements, 11 are based on subsidy
renunciation. The more widely a benefit is renounced, the more likely
Commerce will consider the agreement in the public interest.38
most likely [o request continuation when an export tax is involved, or when the country
involved is not, but may become, a "country under the Agreement (Subsidies Code)" under
section 701(b) of the Act (and thus become entitled to an injury test). Respondent is most likely
to request continuation when it believes the ITC will not find injury.
35In fact, Commerce is so negative toward AD suspensions that its current policy is generally
to investigate exporters accounting for as little as 60 percent of all exports to the U.S.
Suspension agreements require participation by exporters accounting for at least 85 percent of
all exports to the U.S.
'Although Commerce may not take into account foreign policy considerations in making
subsidy or dumping determinations, it believes such factors are relevant to public interest
determinations under sections 704(d) and 734(d) of the Act.
a'Alternatively, exporters can agree to cease exports to the U.S., but that usually isn't an
attractive option to them. But cf. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela, 47 Fed. Reg. 44362
(1982), which involved only one exporter with very small shipments to the U.S.
'Foreign companies understandably wish to renounce as few subsidies as possible. They may
agree to give up export subsidies on exports to the U.S., but are unlikely to relinquish subsidies
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Commerce is decidedly negative about export tax suspension agreements,
in view of clear Congressional and industry objections to them. However, it
does not absolutely preclude export tax suspension agreements, as evi-
denced by its conclusion of one in October 1983, based upon petitioner's
preference for an export tax suspension and the nature of certain tax
subsidies involved.
Of CVD suspensions, Commerce is most negative to agreements based
on quotas. It has never concluded one and does not aim to cartelize world
trade in any product that happens to come under AD or CVD investiga-
tion. Consumers-whose views are relevant to the required determination
whether a quota suspension agreement is in the public interest-are seldom
as mobilized as the domestic industry.39
With settlement agreements, as opposed to suspension agreements, Com-
merce has a clear statutory option to terminate an investigation if a domestic
industry chooses to withdraw its petition.' The Administration recently
opposed amendments to H.R. 4784 (the Trade Remedies Reform Act of
1984) that would have significantly curtailed its authority to settle cases
based on quotas. 41 Yet Commerce has only once negotiated government-to-
government quotas leading to termination of AD/CVD investigations based
on petition withdrawals. 2 It intends to continue this reserved, cautious
approach.
HI. Conclusion
While suspension agreements and settlements are useful tools, Com-
merce today regards them as the exceotion rather than the rule, and expects
on exports to third countries. Many domestic industries think that is not enough. Their view is
that money is fungible; as long as export subsidies are still pouring into a company's coffers,
renouncing U.S. export subsidies merely reduces rather than eliminates the amount of sub-
sidies benefiting U.S. exports. See, e.g., letter of February 2, 1984, from Eugene L. Stewart,
Esq., to Alan F. Holmer, re Float Glass from Mexico: Comments on Proposed Suspension
Agreement at 6 et seq.39An exception to this rule was the countervailing duty investigations of textiles, apparel and
related products from the People's Republic of China. In a related public conference held
November 3-4, 1983, Commerce heard from many importers, such as K Mart Corp., Zayre
Corp., J.C. Penney Purchasing Corp., and the Textile and Apparel Group of the American
Association of Exporters and Importers. However, these cases were terminated on December
6, 1983, based on petitioners' withdrawal of their complaint. 48 Fed. Reg. 55492 (1983).
4°See, e.g., notices terminating investigations of Railcars from Canada (CVD), 48 Fed. Reg.
6793 (1983); Textiles, Apparel and Related Products from the PRC (CVD), supra; Lightweight
Polyester Filament Fabrics from Japan (AD), 49 Fed. Reg. 4021 (1984); and Certain Carbon
Steel Products from Mexico (CVD), 49 Fed. Reg. 17790 (1984).41Letter from Secretary Malcolm Baldrige and Ambassador William Brock to Dan Rosten-
kowski, Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, dated April 3, 1984.42 0n the basis of the U.S.-EC steel arrangements described supra, petitioners withdrew
petitions and Commerce terminated 44 AD and CVD investigations. 47 Fed. Reg. 49058
(1982).
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to conclude relatively few. Parties proposing them should therefore articu-




0O 0 0A o .O .. .
- 0.o ~ .. . 0.
0 ~ ~ 0))
0)C0 0 6 E)O 0 .z 0 )0 0
~~0. ~ 8 "a 8. 00 C .
0)00 >.000) 0) 0
> E E > ~ >
0.00o 0 00.0 0 0 0 0.0 o o0o





mO CO CO 
0
ru
C. 0. Q. '
0.~~ 0. 0 0
0~ 0 o
' d~ .0 .0 0


















u At V- El A4




U.S. Import Law and Policy Series 695
t; 00 t t
o 0 . 0 0... . 0 U 4)
0. . 0. U 0 0. U 0 0. 0
0 0~ 0 3
2T o. 2 0
> > 0) 0) >4) 0. > 0 0.-
o .. 0 0 0 02 0~ U0





















00 00 ON ON









22 0 00 '0 20 0 '4 00 .00 0

























-0 6 , "o





>) * 0E E4
0 -Z
m S.. 0 =
0020'( LZ a - r a 0 G 4)~ 0 0
-
'11 0 r
lu o 2o. - X t U-
E -,z Ur
-E -5:~ 2 0 ~ E " oE
ts 0.0 'o Umm4
P4 ". 25 M ), )4.)~ - 2 .
r4Cu ca .0 E
0C0  0 06 *1)2 2
.0 z 0 .0. , ur 0.4 00 02 U
0~ , t... 0 00b
0-0 0 uo27, 0. t
=.4) 00. 0 C 'r -4
.;o "o.o. or "-a mc u 0
0 0 E co E.0~ 4 o ..
E 0 u a.
4)~~~~~ E~ > )C ~  ~ 4C
22, r . b F 0.r
V) o'o o . 8- 0 'C2 05 C= q
VOL. 18, NO. 3
U.S. Import Law and Policy Series 697







(.. 4t 4 4 0
4).C4) 4 4 4) 00
00 00 4000 0 0 )0
- '.0
00





4 'fl U U
Summer 1984

